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Resumen
Siguiendo los resultados teóricos y empíricos analizados en un artículo pu-
blicado en un número previo de Estudios Internacionales sobre el impacto 
de la globalización en las políticas fiscales de los países de la Organización 
para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (OCDE), este artículo 
presenta una investigación empírica sobre el impacto de la globalización y 
la democracia en las políticas fiscales de 17 países latinoamericanos en las 
décadas de 1980 y 1990. Usando diferentes indicadores para medir globa-
lización (movilidad de capital y apertura comercial), democracia (Índice 
de Libertad) y la tasa de impuesto legal (Tasa de Impuesto a las Empresas, 
Tasa de Impuesto a los Ingresos Personales, y Tasa del Impuesto al Valor 
Agregado), este artículo analiza si la globalización presenta una negativa 
o positiva correlación con las tasas de impuesto al capital y ingresos altos, 
tasa de impuesto al trabajo, y tasa de impuesto a los consumidores en 
los países de Latinoamérica analizados. Adicionalmente, se evalúa si la 
globalización y la democracia ejercen un efecto «compensatorio» o, por 
el contrario, «eficiente» en las tasas de impuesto al capital, trabajo y de 
consumidores en Latinoamérica. 
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Abstract
Following the theoretical and empirical findings reviewed in an article 
published in a previous issue of Estudios Internacionales on the impact 
of globalisation on fiscal policies of Organisation for Economic Coo-
peration and Development (OECD), countries1, this paper presents 
empirical research on the impact of globalisation and democracy on  
tax policies of 17 Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Using different indicators to capture globalisation (capital mobility and 
openness), democracy (Index of Freedom) and the statutory tax rate 
(Corporate Income Tax Rate, Personal Income Tax Rate and Value-
Added Tax Rate), this article analyses whether globalisation presents a 
negative or positive correlation with capital and high income tax rates, 
labour and consumers tax rates in Latin American countries considered. 
Additionally, it assesses whether globalisation and democracy exert a 
«compensatory» or «efficient» effect on capital, labour and consumers 
tax rates in Latin America. 
Key Words: Globalisation – Tax Policies – Democracy - Latin Ame-
rica. 
1 Camargo Brito, Ricardo (2006), «The Globalisation Debate Revisited: An Assessment of 
the ‘Constraints’ of Fiscal Policies of the Nation-States», Estudios Internacionales, Nº 153, 
pp. 37-67.
103
Ricardo Camargo Brito • Globalisation and Tax Policies in Latin America
Introduction
While the impact of globalisation 
on tax policies is a controversial mat-
ter within OECD countries, as was 
documented in an article published in 
a previous issue of Revista de Estudios 
Internacionales2, in Latin America this 
debate is still in a germinal stage. In-
deed, to what extent globalisation is af-
fecting the ability of the Latin American 
governments to conduct autonomous 
tax policies is an open question.
Recently, many scholars have agreed 
that in the last 25 years of the twenti-
eth century, the economic structural 
model of Latin American countries 
experienced dramatic changes3. The 
old model of the state-directed import-
substituting industrialization, which 
was predominant in Latin America 
during the 1960s, became obsolete dur-
ing the 1970s and was replaced by the 
open regionalism model4. However, the 
implementation of this new model was 
not homogenous across time, area or 
country. Indeed, it was a consequence 
of the gradual introduction of a series 
of structural reforms in tariffs, the 
2 Camargo (2006).
3 See Morley, Machado and Pettinato 
(1999), Lora and Barrera (1997), and 
Edwards (1995). 
4 The open regionalism model was charac-
terised, on the one hand, by the increasing 
opening of the internal economy to foreign 
competition and, on the other hand, by 
the progressive reduction of the role pla-
yed by governments in directing the allo-
cation of resources and production of the 
economy. See Paunovic (2000).
national and international financial 
system, taxes, the role of the state en-
terprise and labour regulation5.
Although it is undisputable that 
Latin American governments have 
decisively implemented reforms to 
open their economies and societies to 
globalisation, it is not clear at all what 
impact it has had on the tax policies 
of the nation states, i.e. whether the 
Latin American governments have 
privileged an efficiency or compensa-
tion hypotheses.
In a purely theoretical reflection, the 
efficiency hypothesis points out that 
during a globalisation process, mobile 
capital should be exempted from taxa-
tion altogether and immobile domestic 
factors (labour) should be taxed in-
stead. The corollary of this prediction 
indicates that capital tax rates fall and 
labour tax rates rise with the increase 
of capital mobility6. 
In turn, the compensation hypoth-
esis indicates that democratic and left-
oriented governments would exercise 
a sort of balance on prediction derived 
from the efficiency hypothesis. In this 
sense, we should expect that in demo-
cratic and left-oriented governments the 
fall of corporate tax rates and the rise of 
labour tax rates were less intense than 
5 For a revision of Structural Reforms in 
Latin America, see Morley, Machado and 
Pettinato (1999).
6 Apart from some methodological proble-
ms this seems to be the case for the Orga-
nisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, see Ca-
margo Brito (2006), p. 48.
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those results registered in authoritarian 
and centre-right governments7. 
Like those within the countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), the 
impact of globalisation on tax policies 
in Latin America is a matter that cannot 
be resolved without empirical research. 
With this purpose in mind, this article 
presents the result of an investigation 
that intends to show a general and 
aggregate view of the trends that tax 
polices of Latin American countries 
have followed in the course of globali-
sation. 
The paper analyses the correlations 
between globalisation, democracy and 
tax polices for 18 Latin American coun-
tries for which relevant data is avail-
able (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela) for the years 1979 or 1980, 
1986, 1992 and 1997. Additionally, 
it has included the data from 1995 in 
order to make a comparison with com-
mercial, capital account liberalization 
and tax reform indices taken from Mor-
ley, Machado and Pettinato (1999)8.
7 Garrett (1995) found that for the case of 
OECD countries with centre-right gover-
nments, openness exerts a more significant 
influence in the reduction of capital tax 
revenues than in left-oriented govern-
ments.
8 It is important to be cautious with this 
comparison because Morley, Machado 
and Pettinato (1999) use data which in-
cludes Jamaica and excludes Panama and 
Globalisation is defined on the basis 
of two economic variables: capital mo-
bility and trade liberalization. Capital 
mobility is captured by measuring net 
inflows of Foreign Direct Investment 
as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). This indicator allows a 
more acute comparison with the other 
measure utilised in this work to capture 
globalisation: openness. Additionally, it 
considers the capital account liberaliza-
tion index taken from Morley, Macha-
do and Pettinato (1999). This index 
reflects the level of distortion or govern-
ment intervention in the international 
financial sector. It ranges between zero 
and one, one being the most reformed 
or free indicator. The index considers 
the average of four components: control 
of foreign investment, limits on profits 
and interest repatriation, controls on 
external credit by national borrowers 
and capital outflows9. Trade Liberal-
ization is measured by the traditional 
indicator used in most of the studies 
regarding globalisation and tax com-
petition: openness, which is the sum of 
exports and imports as a percentage of 
GDP. Additionally, I have included the 
Commercial Index taken from Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999). This 
Nicaragua, for which this results must be 
only taken as a general proxy of the ave-
rage trends analysed.
9 The index for each component was derived 
from the descriptions contained in the 
International Monetary Fund’s Balance of 
Payments Arrangements, in addition to 
independent information from the World 
Bank country memoranda. See Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999), p. 11.
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index reflects the level of distortion or 
government intervention in the trade 
sector. It ranges between zero and one, 
one being the most reformed or free in-
dicator. The index is the average of two 
subcomponents: the average level and 
the dispersion of tariffs. Data for capi-
tal mobility and trade liberalization is 
taken from World Development Indica-
tors (2000) (CD-ROM version), World 
Bank, Washington, DC registered in the 
Latin America and Caribbean window 
of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development Economic and 
Social Database». 
To capture the degree of democrati-
sation of Latin American countries, 
I have used the Index of Freedom 
elaborated by the Comparative Survey 
of Freedom (1999), Freedom House, 
Washington DC, registered in the Latin 
America and Caribbean window of the 
United States Agency for International 
Development Economic and Social 
Database. This index is a seven-point 
scale where 1 represents the most free 
and 7 the least free status.10 This index, 
however, presents two weaknesses. 
Firstly, as is the case with most types of 
indices, a subjective judgment is pres-
ent. Indeed, it is not clearly explained 
in the methodology used by the Com-
parative Survey of Freedom (1999) 
how one score differs from another. 
Secondly, this index has been criticised 
10 The scale is subdivided in the following 
categories: Free = 1-2.5, Partly Free = 3 
– 3.5, Not Free = 5.5 – 7. See the Latin 
America and Caribbean window of the 
USAID Economic and Social Database. 
by Scott et al. (2000) because it grades 
leftist governments more critically 
than rightist governments. McClintock 
(2001) has removed some of these de-
fects. However her index only considers 
data for the 1990s. Therefore, although 
there are some weaknesses, which are 
important to take into account, in 
this research I have used the Index of 
Freedom because it presents data for a 
long period of time, which allows me to 
compare the 1980s and 1990s, which 
are the years covered in this study.
The Comparative Survey of Free-
dom (1999) disaggregates three cat-
egories, all of which are used in this 
paper: the Index of Overall Freedom, 
the Index of Political Rights and the 
Index of Civil Liberties.
The Index of Overall Freedom: this 
is a more general index of freedom and 
integrates items included in the other 
two indices: political rights and civil lib-
erties. In this sense, its scores tend to be 
lower than those of the other indices for 
which the aggregate effects registered 
by it could be in some sense misleading. 
In order to avoid this, I have included 
comparative analyses for each index, 
which allows me to have a clearer pic-
ture of the influence of democracy over 
the dependent variables.
The Index of Political Rights: this 
index uses an eight-item checklist that 
focuses on the freedom and fairness of 
elections, the capacity for competition 
by the political opposition, freedom 
from domination by the military, for-
eign powers, or other powerful groups, 
and minority rights and participation. 
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In this study, I have assumed the defini-
tion of Political Rights formulated by 
the Comparative Survey of Freedom 
(1999): «Political Rights enable people 
to participate freely in the political 
process. In this case, political process 
refers to the system by which the polity 
chooses the authoritative policy makers 
and attempts to make binding decisions 
affecting the national, regional or local 
community. A system is genuinely free 
or democratic to the extent that the 
people have a choice in determining 
the nature of the system and its lead-
ers» (Comparative Survey of Freedom, 
1999).
The Index of Civil Liberties: this 
index uses a fourteen-item checklist 
that focuses on freedom of expression 
and belief, freedom of association and 
organization, the rule of law and hu-
man rights, and personal social and 
economic rights. In this paper, I also 
assume the definition of Civil Liberties 
formulated by the Comparative Survey 
of Freedom (1999): «Civil Liberties are 
the freedoms to develop views, institu-
tions and personal autonomy apart 
from the state» (Comparative Survey 
of Freedom, 1999).
Tax policy, instead, is assumed as 
a dependent variable captured by the 
statutory tax rate11. The statutory tax 
rate presents the problem that it does 
not adequately capture the effective tax 
burden12 because this is not only de-
11 The statutory tax rate is the rate establis-
hed in the tributary law of each country 
analysed.
12 The effective tax burden is the range in 
termined by the statutory tax rates but 
also by the size of the tax base, which 
is influenced by different national com-
plex tax credits, tax-exemptions and 
tax deductions. 
I have considered additional vari-
ables to deal with this problem, al-
though none are fully satisfactory. 
However, the statutory tax rate is, at 
least, a general proxy to assess the be-
haviour of governments relating to the 
impact of globalisation on tax polices, 
if a clear and constant tendency along 
the years between both variables is 
found. The use of the effective tax rates, 
considered the best way to measure 
the change in the tax rates within the 
OECD countries, is currently inap-
plicable to Latin American countries 
because of the lack of adequate data.
I consider three types of statutory 
taxes: corporate, personal and value-
added taxes.
Corporate Income Tax Rate (CIT) 
captures the tax rate on capital and 
for this reason is a strategic variable to 
analyse the way in which governments 
have responded to capital competition. 
which the means of the government have 
been affected by the globalisation process. 
However, most researches that have used 
these variables have presented additional 
problems. For instance, the use of corpo-
rate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
by Garrett (1995) and Quinn (1997) pre-
sents a problem in that CIT revenue as a 
percentage of GDP is not a strategic va-
riable. Therefore, governments can deter-
mine the tax burden by the corporate tax 
rates and the tax base but not the GDP. 
See the discussion in Camargo Brito 
(2006), pp. 48-49.
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Additionally, in order to deal with the 
problem of the effective tax burden, I 
have incorporated the analysis of three 
related measurements: the treatment 
of capital gains; the withholding tax 
rates on foreign remittances and the 
net worth or assets tax rate. The data is 
taken from two related studies: Shome 
(1999) and Pita (2000)13. 
Personal Income Tax Rate (PIT) is 
the tax on individual income. I incorpo-
rate this variable into this investigation 
for two main reasons. Firstly, through 
the measure of its top rates, it is possible 
to assess the impact of globalisation on 
taxes that directly affect highly quali-
fied workers, which are the category of 
workers who are more sensible to in-
ternational capital competition. For this 
reason, if the efficiency hypothesis oper-
ates in Latin America, we must expect a 
reduction of the top PIT rates. Secondly, 
low PIT rates provide an indirect way 
to capture the impact of globalisation 
on the labour tax rate.14 In this sense, 
in an efficiency hypothesis scenario, we 
must expect an increase of the low PIT 
rates in Latin American countries. The 
13 These studies, in turn, take data from se-
condary published sources such as the 
publication of tax summaries by Price 
Waterhouse Cooper and Lybrand, Inter-
national Bureau of the Fiscal Documenta-
tion, International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of the IMF; and from the Inter-Ame-
rican Centre of Tax Administrations 
(CIAT), web site: <http://www.ciat.org.> 
See Shome (1999) p. 8 and Pita (2000), p. 
144.
14 This paper does not consider a direct 
measure of labour tax rates due to the lack 
of suitable data.
data for these variables is taken from 
Shome (1999) and Pita (2000).
Value-Added Tax Rate (VAT) is the 
tax on the consumption of goods and 
services. As VAT is a tax that is not 
directly affected by international tax 
competition for mobile capital factors 
between countries, an increase in VAT 
rates with the course of globalisation 
within Latin American countries is 
expected. Data is taken from Shome 
(1999) and Pita (2000).
Additionally, I consider the Tax 
Reform Index taken from Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999). This 
index reflects the level of distortion or 
government intervention in the tax sec-
tor. It ranges between zero and one, one 
being the most reformed or free indica-
tor. This index is the average of four 
sub-components: the maximum mar-
ginal tax rate on corporate incomes, the 
maximum marginal tax rate on personal 
incomes, the value added tax rates and 
the efficiency of the value-added tax15.
Taking into account the aforemen-
tioned indicators of globalisation, 
democracy and tax polices, three hy-
potheses have been formulated in the 
context of this paper: 
a) Globalisation presents a nega-
tive correlation with capital and high 
income tax rates in Latin American 
15 This last indicator is defined as the ratio 
of the VAT rate to the receipts from this 
tax as a ratio of GDP and expresses the 
coverage or the neutrality of the VAT as 
well as the efficiency of the government in 
collecting the tax. See Morley, Machado 
and Pettinato (1999), p. 11.
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countries. This means that capital and 
high income tax rates tend to decrease 
with the increase of globalisation.
b) Globalisation presents a positive 
correlation with labour and consumer 
tax rates in Latin American countries. 
This means that labour and consumer 
tax rates tend to rise with the increase 
of globalisation.
c) The interaction between glo-
balisation and democracy exerts a 
compensation effect on capital, la-
bour and consumer tax rates in Latin 
American countries. This means that 
with the increase of globalisation and 
improving levels of democracy, capital 
tax rates tend to stabilise or increase, 
while labour and consumer tax rates 
tend to decrease.
The Impact of Globalisation 
and Democracy on Top 
Corporate Income Tax Rates
Table 1 shows the evolution of the 
independent variables and Top Corpo-
rate Personal Income Tax (TCIT) rates 
for the years 1980, 1986, 1992 and 
1997. Additionally, it includes the year 
1995 to compare indices of capital ac-
count liberalization, commercial and tax 
reforms taken from Morley, Machado 
and Pettinato (1999). A basic analysis 
of Table 1 shows that between 1980 and 
1986, Top Corporate Income Tax rates 
were positively correlated with both 
variables of globalisation but followed 
a decreasing tendency. This means that 
while FDI and Openness fell, TCIT rates 
also experienced a decline.
Table 1
Top Corporate Income Tax Rates and Independent Variables in 
Latin American countries
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Indicators 1980 1986 1992 1995 1997
Top Corporate Income Tax Rates 69.0 43.3 36.5 -- 27.6
FDI (% GDP) 0.71 0.51 1.33 2.39 4.34
Openness (Trade % GDP) 48.88 42.96 50.09 56.22 58.43
Tax Reform Index 0.307 0.375 0.525 0.573 --
Capital Account Liberalization 0.567 0.545 0.771 0.848 --
Commercial Index 0.662 0.695 0.897 0.946 --
Overall Freedom 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5
Political Rights 3.8 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.5
Civil Liberties 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1
109
Ricardo Camargo Brito • Globalisation and Tax Policies in Latin America
This coincides with the decline of 
capital account liberalisation and with 
the small growth shown by the commer-
cial index16. Only the tax reform index 
16 Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999) 
identify three periods in the implementation 
of structural reforms in Latin America: the 
1970s, the Debt Crisis of the 1980s, and 
the 1990s. The structural reforms started 
in the 1970s, but only for a few areas and 
countries. In fact, Chile, Uruguay, Argen-
tina and Colombia were unique in that 
trade and financial reforms were introdu-
ced in these countries during this decade. 
However, it was only the process of imple-
mentation of trade reforms that reached a 
significant relevancy during this decade. 
Average tariffs were cut in half over the 
1970s. Chile, for instance, which had the 
second highest level of tariff protection in 
the region in 1970, reached the lowest in 
1982. In 1970, almost all Latin American 
Countries had a high degree of control over 
external capital transactions both for their 
citizens and for foreigners. Moreover, this 
situation remained relatively unchanged 
throughout the decade. In 1970 Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru and Venezue-
la had a relatively liberalised international 
financial system, but Argentina, Costa Rica 
and Venezuela suffered a reversion of their 
system between the years 1971 and 1985. 
In 1982, Latin American Countries expe-
rienced a profound economic crisis, which 
severely affected the implementation of the 
new model of open regionalism in the re-
gion. In fact, the trade and international 
financial liberalization processes experien-
ced a temporary reversion, especially in 
Chile and Argentina. The process of inter-
national financial liberalization started 
again in the late 1980s but only in a few 
countries such as Argentina, Costa Rica 
and Guatemala. The trade reform process 
was reinitiated in 1985. However, it was 
only in the 1990s that this process accele-
rated. The 1990s was the decade in which 
no country, except for Brazil and its auto-
showed an improvement, which was, 
in part, reflecting the reduction of TCIT 
rates17. The political variables, in turn, 
were the unique indicators that showed 
a constant tendency towards better levels 
of democratisation in the region during 
these years. Since 1986 a negative correla-
tion has existed between both globalisa-
tion and democracy variables and TCIT 
rates. Figure 1 illustrates the tendencies 
followed by independent variables and 
TCIT rates for the years 1980, 1986, 
1992 and 1997.
Figure 1 confirms that only since 
1986 and especially in the 1990s has 
there been a negative correlation between 
globalisation and TCIT rates. The 1990s, 
the decade in which FDI and openness 
reached the highest scores as it shown 
by Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (below), was the 
period in which the negative correlation 
found between theses both indicators 
and TCIT rates was most intense. 
mobile industry, was using its tariff system 
to protect domestic industry. The average 
in the region was reduced from 46% in 
1985 to 12% in 1995 and the highest 
average tariff was 18% in the Dominican 
Republic. By contrast, the capital liberali-
zation process assumed a more erratic 
pattern. In fact, it increased in the 1990s 
but only for smaller economies such as El 
Salvador, Jamaica and the Dominican Re-
public. However, the bigger economies 
(Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Chile) still 
maintained significant control over foreign 
capital transactions. See Morley, Machado 
and Pettinato (1999), pp 13-23.
17 The other factors than affected the impro-
ving of tax reform scores were the reduc-
tion of Top Personal Income Tax Rates 
and the increase of Value-Added Tax 
Rates for the same period.
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Source: Elaborated by the author.
Figure 1
 Top Corporate Income Tax Rates and Independent Variables
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Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.3 also confirms that the 
negative correlation between FDI and 
TCIT rates started in 1986 and since 
then has experienced a high level of 
concordance. However, the decline in 
TCIT rates began before 1986 with the 
spectacular growth experienced by FDI 
in the region. In fact, in 1980 TCIT 
rates ranged at an average of 69 percent 
and in 1986 had been reduced to 43.3 
percent. This could indicate that in the 
first stage of the process of reduction of 
TCIT rates in the region (1980-1986), 
governments sought to attract FDI, 
which had experienced a fall between 
these years. As a consequence of these 
Figure 1.2
 Openness (trade as a percentage of GDP)
 Averages in Latin American countries, 1970 - 1999
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Figure 1.4
 Openness and Top Corporate IncomeTax Rate 
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Figure 1.5 shows that the same 
conclusion is arrived at if we compare 
the evolution of the indices of capital 
account liberalization, commercial 
and tax reforms elaborated by Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999) and 
TCIT rates.
In fact, during the years 1980 and 
1986, while the index of capital account 
liberalisation fell, the commercial index 
experienced a small increase and only 
the tax reform experienced a more sig-
nificant increase, which coincided with 
the increase experienced by TCIT rates 
in the same years. Only since 1986 and 
until 1992 have commercial and capital 
account indices shown a clearly nega-
tive correlation with TCIT rates.
Figure 1.5 
Indices of Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999) and 
 Top Corporate Income Tax Rates 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
Corporate Tax Rates 0,69 0,433 0,365
Tax Reform Index 0,307 0,375 0,525
Capital Account Liberalization 0,567 0,545 0,771
Commercial Index 0,662 0,695 0,897
1980 1986 1992
i re 1.5
Indices of Morley, Macha  and Pettinato (1999) and 
Top Corporate Income Tax Rates
Source: Elaborated by the author.
policies, a process of capital competi-
tion and trade growth was generated, 
which tended to accentuate in the fol-
lowing years. Figure 1.3 also confirms 
that the 1990s was the decade in which 
the negative correlation between both 
variables peaked18.
Figure 1.4 shows the correlation 
between openness and TCIT rates. 
As in Figure 1.3, the negative cor-
relation between these indicators only 
started in 1986. Indeed, before this year, 
these indicators presented a positive cor-
relation. However, since 1986 and until 
1997, the negative correlation between 
openness and TCIT rates reached a high 
intensity and was similar to that shown 
by Figure 1.3 for FDI and TCIT rates.
18  This is shown in Figure 1.1 by the incli-
nation of the TCIT rates and FDI cur-
ves.
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The different correlation found 
between FDI and openness with TCIT 
rates for the years 1980 and 1986 and 
for the rest of the period analysed could 
be due to patterns followed by the 
political variables in identical years. In 
fact, Figure 1.6 shows that during the 
years 1980 and 1986 political variables 
registered an increase in the levels of 
democratisation in the region. 
The patterns followed by political 
variables seem to indicate that the 
preliminary cause of the reduction in 
TCIT rates is in fact the new wave 
of democratic governments that were 
installed in the region during these 
years, rather than globalisation un-
derstood as an increasing process of 
capital and trade internationalisation. 
In this sense, democracy within Latin 
American countries would have exerted 
an efficient rather than a compensatory 
effect. This conclusion is ratified by 
the analysis of the following years, in 
which the initially intense and positive 
correlation between the improvement 
of democratisation levels and the de-
crease of TCIT rates continued, but 
with a lower intensity than in the first 
half of the 1980s. Indeed, during the 
1990s, although democracy continued 
to exert an efficient effect, it seems to 
be the high negative correlation found 
between FDI, openness and TCIT 
rates that would better explain the 
reduction of TCIT rates in accordance 
with a more classical explanation of 
a process of capital competition and 
trade growth.
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that 
the decrease in TCIT rates in Latin 
American countries has followed a 
more accelerated pattern than in the 
countries of the Organisation for Eco-
Figure 1.6
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nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), where the same tendency 
occurred but with a lower intensity, 
at least between 1992 and 1997, as is 
shown in Figure 1.7
Figure 1.7
Top Corporate Income Tax Rates: Latin American and OECD 
countries (1986, 1992 and 1997)
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Figure 1.7
Top Corporate Income Tax Rates: Latin American and OECD countries 
(1986, 1992 and 1997)
Data: Elaborated by the author with data taken from Shome (1999); and Pita (2000). 
The Impact of Globalisation 
and Democracy on Personal 
Income Tax Rates
Table 2 compares the evolution of 
the Top Personal Income Tax (TPIT) 
rates and independent variables in 
Latin American Countries, for the years 
1979, 1986, 1992 and 1997. Addition-
ally, the table includes the year 1995 
to compare indices of capital account 
liberalization, commercial and tax 
reforms taken from Morley, Machado 
and Pettinato (1999).
The general view of Table 2 is 
similar to that registered for Table 1. 
Indeed, again the negative correla-
tion between FDI, openness and TPIT 
rates was only true since 1986. Before 
this year, the correlation was positive, 
that is, FDI and openness decreased at 
the same time as TPIT rates, which is 
shown graphically in Figure 2.
This tendency is ratified by Figure 
2.1, which compares the evolution 
of FDI and TPIT rates and also by 
Figure 2.2, which compares openness 
and TPIT rates. Both charts confirm 
that the reduction of TPIT rates that 
started before globalisation had an 
important impact on the region. These 
indicators again show that it was the 
political action of Latin American 
governments, relatively unaffected by 
the constraints imposed by the process 
of capital competition at this time, that 
caused the reduction of TPIT rates in 
Latin American countries. Moreover, 
a process of capital competition was 
only recognisable since 1986 and par-
ticularly in the 1990s. In fact, the cut 
in taxes in Latin America was probably 
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Table 2
Top Personal Income Tax Rates and Independent Variables
in Latin American Countries
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Indicators 1979 1986 1992 1995 1997
Top Personal Income 
Tax Rates
53.87 49.0 38.1 -- 34.2
FDI (% GDP) 0.93 0.51 1.33 2.39 4.34
Openness (Trade % 
GDP)
44.59 42.96 50.09 56.22 58.43
Capital Account 
Liberalization
0.559 0.545 0.771 0.848 --
Commercial Index 0.654 0.695 0.897 0.946 --
Tax Reform Index 0.304 0.375 0.525 0.573 --
Overall Freedom 1.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5
Political Rights 3.8 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.5
Civil Liberties 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.1
Figure 2
Independent Variables and Top Personal Income Tax Rates
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due to the necessity to attract more 
capital and commerce to the region, 
which had been affected by an eco-
nomic recession during these years. In 
this sense, it is possible to conclude that, 
at the least, globalisation exerted an 
indirect effect upon the early stages of 
the process of reduction of TPIT rates 
in Latin American countries, and since 
1986 its impact has acquired a direct 
and intense effect in the line of the ef-
ficiency hypothesis. 
Figure 2.1
FDI (as a percentage of GDP) and Top Personal Income Tax Rates
Figure 2.1
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Openness and Top Personal Income Tax Rates 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Top Personal Income Tax
Rates
53,87 49 38,1 34,2
Openness (Trade % GDP) 44,59 42,96 50,09 58,43
1979 1986 1992 1997
Fi e 2.2
Openness and Top ers al Income Tax Rates
Source: Elaborated by the author.
117
Ricardo Camargo Brito • Globalisation and Tax Policies in Latin America
The correlation shown by FDI, 
openness and TPIT rates is confirmed 
by Figure 2.3, which describes patterns 
followed by TPIT rates and indices of 
capital account liberalization, commer-
cial and tax reform taken from Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999).
Between the years 1979 and 1986, 
the index of capital account liberaliza-
tion experienced a fall, the commercial 
index had a small increase, and only 
the tax reform significantly improved, 
which was in part a reflection of the 
reduction of TPIT rates. Coincidently 
with our results, capital account liber-
alization and commercial indices have 
only consistently negatively correlated 
with TPIT rates since 1986.
Again, the explanation of the dis-
similar patterns of correlation found be-
tween globalisation variables and TPIT 
rates for the series of years 1979-1986 
and 1986-1992 and 1997 is probably 
found in the tax policies implemented by 
the new democracies that emerged in the 
region during the earlier 1980s.
Figure 2.3
Indices of Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999) and 
Top Personal Income Tax Rates
Figure 2.3
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Indeed, Figure 2.4 confirms that the 
improvement of the three indices of 
democratisation maintained a highly 
positive correlation with the reduction 
of TPIT rates between the years 1979 
and 1986, which means that TPIT rates 
were reduced along with the improve-
ment of levels of democracy in the 
region. Since 1986 and especially in the 
1990s the correlation was still positive 
but less intense.
118
Estudios Internacionales 158 (2007) • Universidad de Chile
Furthermore, it is worthwhile notic-
ing that the rate of decline experienced 
by TPIT rates in Latin American coun-
tries has been considerably more rapid 
Figure 2.4
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Political Variables and Top Personal Income Tax Rates
Source: Elaborated by the author.
than in the OECD countries, where the 
same tendency has happened, as Figure 
2.5 shows.
Figure 2.5
 Top Personal Income Tax Rates
 Latin American and OECD countries 
(1985/1986, 1991 and 1997)
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Data: Elaborate by the author with data taken from Shome (1999); and Pita (2000).
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This tendency is particularly rel-
evant because it shows a reduction in 
tax rates that is of direct concern to 
highly qualified workers, revealing that 
a possible process of tax competition 
has been affecting these workers in 
Latin America.
The Impact of Globalisation 
and Democracy on Low 
Personal Income Tax Rates 
Table 3 shows the evolution of the 
Low Personal Income Tax (LPIT) rates 
and independent variables in Latin 
American countries in the years 1985, 
1991 and 1997. It also includes the year 
1995 to compare indices of Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999).
The general view of Table 3 indi-
cates that during the years 1985 and 
1991, there was a negative correlation 
between globalisation variables and 
LPIT rates. That is, while FDI and 
openness grew from 0.51 percent to 
1.28 percent and from 42.96 percent 
to 49.91 percent, respectively, LPIT 
rates decreased from 7.0 percent to 5.1 
percent. In turn, for the same years, 
the political variables presented erratic 
behaviour. Indeed, the Overall Freedom 
Index experienced a moderate decline, 
the Political Rights Index improved and 
Indicators 1985 1991 1995 1997
Low Personal Income Tax 
Rates
7.0 1/ 5.9 -- 8.7
FDI (% GDP) 0.51 1.28 2.39 4.34
Openness (Trade % GDP) 42.96 49.91 56.22 58.43
Tax Reform Index 0.375 0.460 0.573 --
Capital Account 
Liberalization
0.545 0.745 0.848 --
Commercial Index 0.695 0.850 0.946 --
Overall Freedom 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5
Political Rights 2.8 2.2 2.9 2.5
Civil Liberties 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1
Table 3
Low Personal Income Tax Rates and Independent Variables
in Latin American Countries
Source: Elaborated by the author
1/ This considers the averages between the years 1985 and 1986.
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the Civil Liberties Index maintained 
a constant score. However, since the 
three political indicators experienced 
an improvement in their average scores 
during the 1980s (see Table 3.1, below) 
democracy seemed to exert a positive 
influence on the decrease of LPIT during 
this time. Finally, the indices of Morley, 
Machado and Pettinato (1999) show a 
constant and significant improvement 
during these years.
By contrast, as is seen in Table 3, in 
1991 and 1997 the correlation between 
globalisation variables and LPIT rates 
became positive and significant, which 
is coincident with the patterns followed 
by the indices of Morley, Machado and 
Pettinato (1999). Although the political 
variables presented the best average 
scores in the 1990s (see Table 3.1, be-
low), Table 3 shows that for the years 
1991, 1995 and 1997 their patterns 
followed a relatively stable tendency, 
which is reflected in the improving rates 
of the overall freedom and political 
rights indices.
Figure 3 shows graphically these 
tendencies.
Figure 3
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Figure 3
Independent Variables and Low Personal Income Tax Rates
Source: Elaborated by the author.
As we can see in Figure 3, patterns 
followed by LPIT rates in the 1990s 
clearly show a relevant influence of 
globalisation. In fact, since 1991, the 
previous decline experienced by LPIT 
rates between the years 1985 and 1991, 
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had a reversion and actually began to 
show constant growth, which coincided 
with the accelerated growth of FDI and 
openness during this time. This means 
that the efficiency hypothesis was clear-
ly manifest in the increase of LPIT rates 
during the 1990s. As we know, LPIT is 
an indirect indicator of labour taxation 
in Latin America, for which, it is pos-
sible to argue that at least in the 1990s, 
the decline found by Rodrik (1997, p. 
20) in the effective labour tax rates for 
OECD countries also occurred in Latin 
American countries19. This judgment is 
ratified by Figures 3.1 and 3.2, which 
show the correlations existed between 
FDI and LPIT rates and openness and 
LPIT rates, respectively.
19 For an analysis of the empirical findings 
of Rodrik (1997), see Camargo Brito 
(2006), pp. 47-48.
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Figure 3.2
Openness and Low Personal Income Tax Rates
Source: Elaborated by the author.
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Both charts illustrate that it was at 
the beginning of the 1990s that globali-
sation started having significant levels 
of intensity in the region, when the posi-
tive correlation between FDI, openness 
and LPIT reached a peak.
The analysis of the political varia-
bles showed in Figure 3.3 indicates 
that during the years in which LPIT 
rates experienced a reduction (between 
1985 and 1991), the political variables 
steadily improved as averages. This 
could mean that the reduction of LPIT 
rates was the «change money» used 
for democracies to compensate for the 
decrease in TCIT rates and TPIT rates 
during the same years.
Figure 3.3 
Political Variables and Low Personal Income Tax Rates
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Political Variables and Low Personal Income Tax Rates
Source: Elaborated by the author.
The analysis of the years 1991 and 
1997 confirm that it was only during 
the 1980s, the decade in which the 
impact of globalisation was less in-
tense, that democracy had the biggest 
influence on the determination of tax 
policies of Latin American countries. 
Indeed, during the 1990s, although 
the indices of democratisation reached 
the highest average scores in the series 
analysed, as shown by Table 3.1 (be-
low) and Figure 3.4, the intensity of 
improvement was lower than in the 
1980s. The intensity of improvement 
is showed by the inclination degree of 
the curve in each indices, as it is shown 
by Figure 3.5. 
By contrast, the levels of globalisa-
tion were higher and more intense in 
the 1990s than in the 1980s (see Figures 
1.1. and 1.2, above). For this reason, 
the increase in LPIT rates seems to find 
a more plausible explanation in the 
response given by democratic regimes 
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1970s 1980s 1990s
Average of Overall Freedom 1.95 1.56 1.52
Average of Political Rights 4.29 3.15 2.62
Average of Civil Liberties 3.75 3.39 3.13
Table 3.1
Averages of Indices of Freedom in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Table 3.4
Indices of Freedom Averages in Latin America countries, 1972-1999
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Table 3.5
Indices of Freedom Averages in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Figure 3.4
 Indices of Freedom
 Averages in Latin America countries, 1972 -1999 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Years
Sc
al
e 
(1
-7
)
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
Sc
al
e(
1-
7)
Overall Freedom Political Rights Civil Liberties
Figure 3.5
 Indices of Freedom
Av rages in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
0
1
2
3
4
5
1970s 1980s 1990s
Years
Sc
al
e 
(1
-7
)
2,8
3
3,2
3,4
3,6
3,8
Sc
al
e 
(1
-7
)
Average of Overall Freedom Average of Political Rights Average of Civil Liberties
124
Estudios Internacionales 158 (2007) • Universidad de Chile
to the process of capital competition 
and trade growth experienced by the 
region in these.
Furthermore, as illustrated by Figure 
3.6, the pattern followed by the lowest 
marginal PIT rates in Latin America 
(toward a decrease, from an average 
rate of 7 percent in 1985/1986 to 6 
percent in 1991 and then up again 
to 9 percent in 1997) compared with 
the same lowest marginal PIT rates 
in OECD countries shows that while 
OECD countries experienced a reduc-
tion in these tax rates during the whole 
period described, in Latin America the 
tendency was the inverse since 1991. 
Figure 3.6
 Low Personal Income Tax Rates
 Latin American and OECD countries 
(1985/1986, 1991 and 1997)
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Table 3.6
Low Personal Income Tax Rates Latin American and OECD countries 
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Source: Elaborated by the author.
This could indicate that Latin Amer-
ican workers and middle class people 
– the people who are affected by this tax 
in Latin America – have experienced an 
increase in their income tax rates in an 
epoch under the aegis of globalisation 
and democracy.
The Impact of Globalisation 
and Democracy on Value-
Added Tax Rates 
Table 4 registers the comparative 
evolution of scores of Value-Added Tax 
(VAT) rates and independent variables 
for the years 1980, 1984 and 1997 in 
Latin American countries, as averages. 
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Additionally, it considers the year 1995 
to compare indices of capital account 
liberalisation, commercial and tax re-
form taken from Morley, Machado and 
Pettinato (1999).
Table 4
Value-Added Tax Rates and Independent Variables
in Latin American Countries
Indicators 1980 1984 1995 1997
Value-Added Tax Rates 9.05 9.33 -- 13.69
FDI (% GDP) 0.71 0.39 2.39 4.34
Openness (Trade % GDP) 48.88 43.03 56.22 58.43
Tax Reform Index 0.307 0.324 0.573 --
Capital Account Liberalization 0.567 0.539 0.848 --
Commercial Index 0.662 0.646 0.946 --
Overall Freedom 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.5
Political Rights 3.8 3 2.9 2.5
Civil Liberties 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.1
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Table 4 shows that, for the years 
1980 and 1984, indicators of globalisa-
tion (FDI and openness) and VAT rates 
had a negative correlation. That is, 
while FDI and openness experienced a 
fall, VAT rates increased. As we know, 
the decline of FDI and openness was 
due to the economic recession that af-
fected the region in these years20. These 
results are confirmed by the decrease in 
capital account and commercial indices 
elaborated by Morley, Machado and 
Pettinato (1999) for the same years. 
Only the tax reform index experi-
enced an improvement, which was in 
20  See Note 16 of this article. 
part due to the increase in VAT rates. 
On the contrary, the three indices of 
democratisation experienced significant 
improvement between the years 1980 
and 1984, which was more explicit in 
the political rights index. These results 
can be interpreted as the confirmation 
of the «efficiency» strategy followed by 
democratic governments in the region 
during the earlier 1980s. Indeed, to 
the reduction of TCIT and TPIT found 
in Tables 1 and 2, we have to add the 
incorporation of VAT systems in most 
of the Latin American countries and the 
constant increase of VAT rates since the 
beginning of the 1980s.
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Figure 4 graphically illustrates pat-
terns followed by independent variables 
and VAT rates.
The situation for the years 1984 
and 1997 was the inverse. Indeed, after 
1984, when FDI and openness started 
improving their scores, the correlation 
between both indicators of globalisa-
tion and VAT rates became positive 
and highly significant, especially during 
the 1990s, which is coincident with the 
prediction of the efficiency hypothesis. 
In turn, indices of democratisation still 
maintained a positive correlation with 
VAT rates, but it was less intense than 
in the earlier 1980s.
Figure 4
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Source: Elaborated by the author.
Figure 4.1
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Figure 4.1
FDI (as a percentage of GDP, and Value-Added Tax Rates
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 confirm that 
since 1984 the positive correlation be-
tween indicators of globalisation and 
VAT rates was highly consistent.
Indeed, between the years 1984 and 
1997, FDI, openness and VAT rates not 
only experienced a positive correlation, 
but they also grew in similar magni-
tudes. This highly consistent and posi-
tive correlation allows us to conclude 
that since 1984, and particularly in the 
1990s, the VAT rates were increased 
significantly due to the escalating im-
pact of globalisation.
This judgement is confirmed if we 
separately analyse the correlation fol-
lowed by political variables and VAT 
rates in the same years. As Figure 4.3 
shows, levels of democracy in the region 
continued improving between the years 
1984 and 1997.
However, if we compare the av-
erages of improvement in levels of 
democratisation shown by Table 3.1 
and Figure 3.5 (above) for the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, we notice that the 
intensity of improvement was higher 
between the 1970s and 1980s than be-
tween the 1980s and 1990s. This means 
that in most of the Latin American 
countries the recovery of democracy 
started in the 1980s21 and since then 
it has experienced a constant but only 
moderate improvement. This seems 
to demonstrate that it was only in the 
first stage of democratisation in the 
region that democracy exerted a direct 
and significant efficient effect on VAT 
rates22. After that, when globalisation 
21 In other words, because authoritarian 
governments ruled most of Latin Ameri-
can countries during the 1970s, the recu-
peration of democracy in the 1980s had 
in fact a more significant impact in the 
score of the indices utilised.
22 The direct and significant effect of demo-
cracy refers to its influence as a primary 
cause of the increase of VAT rates, rather 
than to the magnitude that this increase 
eventually reached, which actually was 
lower in the 1980s than in the 1990s.
Figure 4.2
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reached an important level, the influ-
ence of democracy had less relevance, 
even if it continued exerting an efficient 
effect. On the contrary, in the 1990s it 
is the highly positive correlation found 
between indicators of globalisation and 
VAT rates that seems to better explain 
patterns followed by VAT rates. How-
ever, it appears to be clearly established 
that democracy, as well as globalisa-
tion, exerted an efficient rather than a 
compensatory effect on VAT rates in all 
of the periods analysed.
Figure 4.3
Political Variables and Value-Added Tax Rates
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Conclusion
My original question referred to what 
extent the efficiency or compensation 
hypotheses are valid for Latin American 
countries. In other words, what changes 
to the structure of tax rates in Latin 
America have occurred in the course of 
globalisation, and what influence democ-
racy and globalisation have exerted on 
them. In order to answer these questions, 
three hypotheses were formulated.
Hypothesis 1: Globalisation pres-
ents a negative correlation with capital 
and high income tax rates in Latin 
American countries. This means that 
capital and high income tax rates tend 
to decrease with the increase of glo-
balisation.
Capital tax rates have been captured 
by variations of Top Corporate Income 
Tax rates. In turn, high-income rates 
has been analysed by changes in Top 
Personal Income Tax rates. I have found 
that globalisation presented a negative 
correlation with TCIT and TPIT rates 
since 1986 and especially in the 1990s. 
This correlation was highly consistent 
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and relevant in the 1990s when the indi-
ces of globalisation reached their high-
est scores. However, I have also found 
that the decrease of TCIT and TPIT 
rates started before 1986. In fact, in the 
first half of the 1980s TCIT and TPIT 
rates experienced a significant decrease, 
which in turn coincided with a tempo-
rary decline in levels of globalisation in 
the region. On the contrary, democracy 
presented a positive correlation with 
the decrease in TCIT and TPIT rates for 
the whole period analysed, however it 
was more significant in the earlier years 
of the 1980s. I have explained these 
results in the following way. In the first 
half of the decade, when globalisation 
did not have a big impact in the region, 
democracy exerted its biggest influence 
on TCIT and TPIT rates, which was in 
line with the efficiency hypothesis. In 
the second half of the 1980s and in the 
1990s, it was the impact of globalisa-
tion that better explains the diminu-
tion of TCIT and TPIT rates. In other 
words, the initial stage of reduction of 
TCIT and TPIT rates was due to the 
policies implemented by Latin Ameri-
can democratic governments to attract 
more capital to the region. In the second 
stage (after 1986), it seems to be the 
constraints imposed by globalisation, 
through a process of capital competi-
tion, that had more influence on TCIT 
and TPIT rate reduction.
Hypothesis 2: Globalisation pres-
ents a positive correlation with labour 
and consumer tax rates in Latin Ameri-
can countries. This means that labour 
and consumer tax rates tend to rise with 
the increase of globalisation.
Low Personal Income Tax and Val-
ue-Added Tax rates are the indicators 
used to capture variations on labour 
and consumer tax rates respectively. 
With regard to LPIT rates, I have found 
two different periods of correlation: 
the second half of the 1980s and the 
1990s. In the first period, globalisa-
tion presented a negative correlation 
with LPIT rates. This finding can be 
explained by the positive correlation 
presented by democracy and the de-
crease in LPIT rates at the same time, 
which is consistent with the compen-
sation hypothesis. However, in the 
1990s when globalisation had its big-
gest impact on the region, the initial 
negative correlation found between 
globalisation and LPIT was reverted 
and became positive and highly consis-
tent. Therefore, as the LPIT rate is an 
indicator of the labour tax rate in Latin 
American countries, we can conclude 
that despite the initial compensatory 
effect exerted by democracy on LPIT 
rates in the 1980s, globalisation had 
a positive influence on the increase of 
labour tax rates in the 1990s, which is 
a result coincident with predictions of 
the efficiency hypothesis.
In the case of VAT rates, it is also 
possible to identify two phases in the 
correlation of globalisation with VAT 
rates. However, in this case, the first 
stage comprised the years 1980 and 
1984 when globalisation presented a 
negative correlation with VAT rates, 
130
Estudios Internacionales 158 (2007) • Universidad de Chile
which again is explained by the positive 
correlation found between democracy 
and the increase in VAT rates during 
the same years. As the correlation be-
tween globalisation and VAT rates was 
not very significant because of the low 
impact that globalisation had in these 
years in the region, we must explain the 
reduction in VAT rates by the influence 
of democracy. This seems to support 
the «efficiency policies» implemented 
by Latin American democratic gov-
ernments in the first half of the 1980s, 
which included the decrease in TCIT 
rates and the implantation and progres-
sive increase in VAT rates. The second 
stage covered the second half of the 
1980s and the 1990s. In this period, 
globalisation presented a positive and 
highly consistent correlation with VAT 
rates. These results again show that it 
was the impact of globalisation that act-
ed as the primary cause to explain the 
increase of VAT rates in the 1990s.
Hypothesis 3: The interaction 
between globalisation and democracy 
exerts a compensatory effect on the cap-
ital, labour and consumer tax rates in 
Latin American countries. This means 
that with the increase of globalisation 
and the improvement of democracy 
levels capital tax rates tend to stabilise 
or increase, while labour and consumer 
tax rates tend to decrease.
The 1990s was the only decade in 
which it is possible to watch a highly 
significant interaction between globali-
sation and democracy because it was 
then that, for the first time, globalisa-
tion and indices of democracy simul-
taneously reached their highest scores. 
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, I 
have found that democracy exerted an 
efficient rather than a compensatory 
effect with the course of globalisation 
on capital tax, labour and consumer tax 
rates in Latin America. In fact, in the 
1990s, when an accelerated process of 
globalisation was taking place in Latin 
America, democracy had a positive 
correlation with the decrease in TCIT 
and with the increase of LPIT and VAT 
rates. This means that Latin American 
democratic governments have imple-
mented in an uncontested and uncriti-
cal way, a strategy of «efficient» tax 
policies in favour of globalisation. 
This «Latin American way» is more 
evident when it is compared with the 
tax policies followed by OECD coun-
tries. Indeed, within OECD countries, 
TCIT and TPIT rates have experienced 
a softer decrease and LPIT rates have 
actually decreased rather than increased 
–as happened in Latin America– which 
leaves both results in line with the com-
pensation hypothesis.
It is also interesting to note that the 
«efficiency policies» that Latin Ameri-
can democratic governments started to 
implement in the 1980s, which com-
prised the reduction of TCIT rates and 
the introduction of VAT, did not include 
the reduction of LPIT rates, which was 
postponed until the 1990s, when they 
were implemented. This can be ex-
plained by the different political impacts, 
which produced a cut in TCIT rates or 
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an increase in VAT rates in comparison 
to those generated by an augmenta-
tion of LPIT rates. Indeed, while in the 
first case it does not seem to be any 
clearly identifiable sector of population 
concerned23, in the latter, workers and 
middle class people are directly affected, 
which is always difficult for a democratic 
government. However, when globalisa-
tion reached higher levels in the region, 
Latin American democratic governments 
did not seem to have any hesitation in 
completing the implementation of their 
original «efficient policies», through the 
increase of LPIT rates in the 1990s.
Therefore, it is clear that Latin Ameri-
can democratic governments were 
involved in a process of international 
competition for capital and highly quali-
fied workers in order to offer better tax 
conditions to attract them to their nation-
al jurisdictions. However, such a policy 
presents two main problems. On the one 
hand, it is not clear at all that it is the 
best strategy to follow. In fact, paradoxi-
cally, the use of an «efficient» tax policy 
to attract mobile factors of production 
produces a process of international com-
petition, which, in turn, tends to generate 
inefficiencies24. On the other hand, even 
23 However, this is only apparent because the 
increase of VAT rates has a more impor-
tant effect on low-income earners. In turn, 
the reduction of CIT rates directly benefits 
owners of capital.
24 In fact, if it is assumed that governments 
behave rationally, the marginal social 
benefit of taxation (MSBT) is equal to its 
marginal social cost (MSCT). Whether in 
a scenario of immobile capital or perfect 
capital mobility, MSBT remains the same, 
when it would be a successful policy, it 
seems unfair that, as a consequence of the 
increase of labour and consumer taxes, 
workers and middle class people have to 
bear the brunt of the costs.
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